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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper explores the regulatory character of key parts of the latest incarnation of the 
EU telecommunications regulatory package, finalised at the end of 2009. Its core 
argument is that whilst the broad parameters of the modified Electronic Communications 
Regulatory Framework are couched in traditional ‘hard’ legal measures of the EU 
system, in the shape of Directives and a Regulation, in practice the EU’s influence in the 
regulation of telecommunications across its Members’ territories is likely to be much 
looser and bears many hallmarks of ‘softer’ or so-called ‘new’ governance. Here 
voluntarism, opinion-giving, advice taking and the pursuit of best practice are key 
features of the institutional and operational features of the revised regulatory system. The 
paper illustrates this argument through an analysis of institution and process: the new 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), on the one 
hand, and the agreement reached in the new package on regulatory remedies, on the 
other. It argues that both BEREC and the new regulatory remedies process reflect 
European political compromises, due to the still inter-national character of European 
telecommunications, as much as the desire to promote flexibility and responsiveness in  
regulatory decision making.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since approximately the mid 1980s, the European Union (EU) has pursued the 
development of a policy framework for telecommunications. This has resulted, inter alia, 
in a European level regulatory framework periodically and successively modified in the 
pursuit of competition within and across the telecommunications markets of Member 
States. After a lengthy period of review and negotiation, the latest modification of what is 
now known as the European Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF) 
was ratified by the EU on 18 December 2009 with a required implementation date of 
June 2011.  
This paper explores the regulatory character of this latest incarnation of the EU 
telecommunications regulatory package. Its core argument is that whilst the broad  
parameters of the modified ECRF are couched in traditional ‘hard’ legal measures of the 
EU system in the shape of Directives and  a Regulation, in practice the EU’s operational 
influence in the regulation of telecommunications across its Members’ territories is likely 
to be much looser and bears many hallmarks of ‘softer’ or so-called ‘new’ governance. 
Here voluntarism, opinion-giving, advice taking and the pursuit of best practice are key 
features of the institutional and operational context of the revised regulatory system. The 
paper illustrates this argument through an analysis of institution and process: the new 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), on the one 
hand, and the agreement reached in the new package on regulatory remedies, on the 
other. It argues that both BEREC and the new regulatory remedies process reflect 
European political compromises, due to the still inter-national character of European 
telecommunications, as much as the desire to promote flexibility and responsiveness in 
regulatory decision-making. The latest phase in the development of telecommunications 
at the EU level, as much as any other, reflects the problem of deciding how much, and 
what kind of, power in regulatory decision making in telecommunications should take 
place at the European, rather than the national level. 
The paper argues that compromise political outcomes of the kind illustrated in the cases 
of BEREC and regulatory remedies risk inefficacy through reliance on a level of 
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transparency, classic of soft or new governance, which has as yet been undelivered in EU 
telecommunications policy implementation. This risk has been heightened as a result of 
the European Commission’s relative lack of success in securing the degree of 
supranational control proposed, in both the cases of BEREC and regulatory remedies, at 
the outset of the process of modification of the EU’s regulatory framework in 2006. The 
paper proceeds as follows. The next section undertakes a brief review of the main 
features of the recent evolving landscape of regulatory governance in the EU, placing 
particular focus on the emergence of post corporate state and, beyond that, ‘new’ kinds of 
governance forms and associated practices. A key concluding argument of this section is 
that, in its attempt to solve perceived problems of governance, the EU has shown a 
willingness to draw together hard and soft forms of governance. Thereafter, the paper 
turns its attention to an illustration of this feature of EU governance in recent 
developments in the telecommunications sector. A brief characterisation of the nature of 
the development of the EU telecommunications policy package is provided. The paper 
then turns its attention to the case studies of BEREC and regulatory remedies to illustrate 
how, both in respect of institution and process, more flexible, looser forms of regulatory 
governance are likely to play a key role in the revised ECRF, some of which represents a 
continuation of past practices, rather than the more radical changes called for by the 
European Commission at the start of the review. These sections of the paper highlight 
how this outcome was driven significantly by the need to compromise in order to ensure 
progress in policy development. The risks inherent in such an approach are highlighted 
alongside its advantages. The final section of the paper draws some brief conclusions on 
the significance of the case for an understanding of regulatory governance in the EU as 
well as the development of telecommunications regulation.  
 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE EU  
Paradigmatic changes in the European and global political economy within the last 25 
years have made the topic of regulatory governance of prime importance for policy-
makers at national and international levels. The well documented decline of the corporate 
state and the growth of marketisation (that is market values and practices) in a range of 
sectors where the state was formally both owner and manufacturer/service provider 
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generated the problem of managing, beyond the parameters of competition law, the 
functioning and development of key parts of the economy. The solution spawned a raft of 
independent public regulatory authorities (Heritier 2002), initially at the national level 
(Thatcher 2002). However, the liberalisation of formerly uncompetitive sectors that the 
decision to marketise involved was also expressed in the language of international 
economic integration or, taken to its ultimate conclusion, globalisation (Dicken 2003). 
Thus, states faced often simultaneous, inter-related challenges of developing from former 
government responsibility and action, independent governance forms and functions to 
address the perceived challenges of an era of increasing market based competition, 
domestically and internationally. Governance has thus become a multi-faceted and 
complex phenomenon. A key feature is the degree of hierarchy present in any governance 
system, reflecting the extent of state, juridical, or more broadly, public authority therein.  
 
Increasingly, sectors of the economy formerly under state control have had their 
evolution determined and managed by public appointees constituted in regulatory bodies 
at national, and occasionally, European level. As this process has developed within the 
wider marketisation project embarked upon by European governments, it has been 
inevitable that private actors have begun to play increasingly significant roles in 
governance. However, the process has not necessarily given the latter a prime role, let 
alone a determinative one, in governance. Paradoxically, whilst private actors are 
encouraged to engage in the governance process, particularly at the EU level through 
consultation and lobbying, the key role of public authorities as market shapers and 
managers has prevented this possible prominent role from occurring. Through time, such 
sector specific regulation has shown some signs of giving way to market governance 
through the parameters of the legal system, in this case through competition law.  
 
Less hierarchically, systems of regulatory governance have developed in which public 
and private actors work together (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). Here, it is important 
to make a distinction between private actors as regulators solely, on the one hand, and as 
both regulators and regulatees, on the other. In the former case, it is possible for the state 
to appoint a private regulatory body to oversee the functioning of a particular (sub) 
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sector. Though rare, there is some evidence of this in the electronic network 
communications sector in Internet governance, albeit with strong hierarchical public 
policy supervision (Christou and Simpson 2008). In the latter case, a system of private 
interest self-regulation exists, which could be state or juridically sanctioned and 
shadowed, such as in certain aspects of press regulation, or constructed through the 
motivation of market participants (see Verhulst and Price 2005). A recent example of the 
latter was the early governance of the UK’s Internet country code top level domain (see 
Christou and Simpson 2009). 
 
This spectrum of governance forms since the decline of the corporate state in Europe has, 
commensurately, generated a series of practices determined by the degree of hierarchy 
present in the system of regulatory governance in question.  Early manifestations in 
sectors into which independent public regulation was introduced tended to place national 
(and occasionally international) regulatory authorities as central. The latter interpret a 
regulatory remit from legislation and develop regulatory practices around key functions 
such as market monitoring, and, where necessary, behaviour modification through 
sanctions and development of existing regulatory parameters and commensurate rules. 
However, less rigid practices of regulatory governance have more recently also emerged, 
originally associated with less hierarchical systems in which at least some degree of 
private actor influence and authority is evident. Here, ‘softer’ regulatory action associated 
with generating shared understanding of what are appropriate behaviours is relevant. 
Thus, the production of statements of desirable performance standards and reference 
performance benchmarks are characteristic. Important too, is the generation of 
professional opinions and advice aimed at modifying future behaviour. Such systems and 
their associated practices with the intention to operate flexibly and promote openness, 
discursiveness, shared understandings and, ultimately, common purpose, have recently 
emerged under the term ‘new’ governance (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). Operating 
effectively, advocates argue, that these practices can increase the innovativeness and 
efficacy, as well as promoting the democratisation, of regulatory governance systems.  
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For European states, particularly since the mid-1980s, the EU has been utilised as a 
partial means of developing and implementing regulatory governance in chosen sectoral 
markets. This also provided an at the time much needed shot in the arm to European 
integration efforts and resulted in claims of the birth of the European ‘regulatory’ state 
(Majone 1996) to complement, in theory at least, the ‘regulatory’ state at the national 
level (Seidman and Gilmour 1986). Thus, the development of regulatory governance of 
various kinds and the pursuit of European integration at EU level through the last two and 
half decades have become intertwined, though not always harmoniously.  In particular, 
policy actions taken by the EU in a raft of areas covered by the pursuit of the Single 
European Market initiative (European Commission 1985), not least in 
telecommunications, have often been exemplars of the ideas and practices of international 
regulatory capitalism (Levi-Faur, Jordana and Gilardi 2005), on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the ongoing, increasingly multi-dimensional, struggle between supranational and 
intergovernmental based European integration. The tension between the two forces, as 
candidly illustrated in telecommunications, is often played out in the context of the 
practical necessity of having to conduct at the European level some form of regulatory 
governance activity which may have a direct bearing on national regulatory conditions 
and practices. Thus, unsurprisingly, recent work by Borzel (2010: 192) has found ‘a 
combination of different forms of governance that cover the entire range between market 
and hierarchy’.  
  
An interesting feature of the development of regulatory governance in Europe, 
particularly at the EU level, is some recent evidence of complexity in systems beyond the 
‘straightforward’ characterisations of regulatory governance and practices described 
above. Thus, for example, in telecommunications there is some evidence of the 
development of international regulatory networks, promoted by supranational actors such 
as the European Commission, aimed at addressing perceived shortfalls in the 
supranational policy apparatus at EU level to deliver designated objectives in policy 
areas. A key question concerns the extent to which these are, or would become, in the 
eyes of those who designed them and those who participate in them, transnational in 
nature. The existence of variety across the spectrum of regulatory governance at EU level 
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raises the interesting possibility for innovativeness to occur within its various sectors of 
practice. It is certainly possible to explore potential complementarities of some of the 
more hierarchical forms and, by contrast, some of the more flexible practices of 
regulatory governance. Such experimentalism may possess the potential to enhance the 
quality and efficiency of regulatory governance. This paper shows how the latest revision 
of the EU telecommunications framework provides examples of such intra-sectoral 
variety. Here, the EU has sought to employ softer governance practices, from within the 
‘new’ governance policy toolkit, in tandem with better established, more hierarchical, 
elements of regulatory state governance such as EU Regulations, Directives and 
Decisions. The existence of this kind of policy innovation, which has been utilised in 
telecommunications since the early part of the last decade, raises the interesting issues of 
the motivations behind such policy activity, the extent to which it has been the subject of 
political contestation and is thus controversial, as well as its chances of success. After a 
brief characterisation of the development of EU telecommunications policy to the point 
of commencement of the 2006 review, it is to these issues that the remainder of this paper 
addresses itself. 
 
 
TENSIONS IN THE CHARACTER OF EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
GOVERNANCE  
Since approximately the mid-1980s, the EU has developed a policy package and 
attendant regulatory framework for the governance of telecommunications. This system 
has been framed by hierarchical legislation at the EU level, mostly in the form of market 
liberalising and harmonising directives (Michalis 2007). Telecommunications markets 
across the EU are now ordered according to competitive norms and practices, though an 
elaborate and costly system of ex-ante regulation is required to create and manage 
competition, implemented nationally by a series of telecommunications National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) (Goodman 2006), notwithstanding the EU’s policy 
aspiration to see telecommunications governed exclusively by EU competition law. 
Overall, public legislative and regulatory actors have predominated, a key ongoing 
feature of which has been the balance of power between the national and EU level and 
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regular attempts to alter this, made, in particular, by the European Commission and often 
resisted by Member States. Telecommunications policy development at EU level has thus 
often been the subject of contestation between supranational and intergovernmental 
interests (Simpson 2009), both of which are present in the system though the former are 
significantly outweighed by the latter. This is often manifest at key points of policy 
review in EU telecommunications, the most important of which have been launched in 
1992, 1999 and, most recently, 2006. A notably feature of these reviews has been the 
expression of frustration by the European Commission at perceived underperformance in 
the day to day regulation of telecommunications and proposals to rectify this1
 
. In the 
latter two policy reviews, part of the Commission’s solution has been proposals to 
strengthen regulatory authority at EU level through enhancement of its own power in 
tandem with the creation of new European level regulatory-institutional resources. The 
broad aim here has been to create a new European level regulatory axis to ensure 
consistent and effective implementation of the EU’s regulatory framework which would 
involve enhancement of EU hierarchical governance-based decision-making. Such efforts 
have been resisted, though not completely, by Member States. An interesting 
consequence of the political debate has been compromise solutions which aim to address 
the problems of regulation highlighted by the Commission through soft regulatory 
measures.  
The remainder of the paper exemplifies this through an analysis of two aspects of the 
most recent period in the review and revision of the EU telecommunications regulatory 
package: the creation of the Body of European Regulators in Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) and EU policy for regulatory remedies.  The review of what, since 2002, has 
been known as the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF) began in 
late 2005 with a call for input from interested parties. Subsequent to this, in June 2006, 
the Commission released a communication document on the review summarising its 
proposals (European Commission 2006a) as well as a Staff Working Document 
(European Commission 2006b) and an Impact Assessment document (European 
Commission 2006c) providing greater detail on the relevant issues and its proposals. 
From this, a second consultative phase was launched which culminated in a report on the 
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consultation and revised proposals in 2007 (European Commission 2007). After a 
protracted period of consideration by the European Parliament and European Council of 
Ministers a revised framework was eventually agreed in November 2009, which should 
become operational by mid 2011. The latest review has been one of the most 
controversial and fractious periods in the history of EU telecommunications policy. 
 
THE BODY OF EUROPEAN REGULATORS IN ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS  
 
The June 2006 documentation produced by the European Commission launching its 
ECRF review did not contain any proposals to create a new European level regulatory 
body. The idea itself was by that stage not a new one, having been proposed three times 
during the 1990s. It was, however, an unpopular one with EU Member States, having 
been firmly rejected on each occasion. On the last of these occasions, an initial proposal 
by the European Commission stemming from the 1999 Review of Electronic 
Communications (European Commission 1999) would have established a High Level 
Communications Group to take regulatory decisions, composed of NRAs and the 
European Commission, the latter with a voting right (Michalis 2004). Interestingly, whilst 
rejected, a compromise outcome was the creation of the European Regulators Group 
(ERG) in 2002. The ERG was composed of EU NRAs and chaired by the Commission in 
a non-voting capacity. Rather than being the kind of supranational decision-making body 
with hierarchical decision making power the Commission wished, the ERG was 
‘intergovernmental’ in nature and operated according to the parameters of soft or ‘new’ 
governance. It was in essence an advisory-only body to the Commission. The intention 
was that NRAs would convene to share regulatory experiences and develop best practice 
standards and benchmarks, reaching agreement through the pursuit of consensus. 
However, the ERG did not exhibit the openness often associated, in theory at least, with 
soft governance bodies (Sutherland 2008).  
 
As the implementation of the ECRF proceeded, the European Commission too became 
increasingly dissatisfied with certain aspects of the ERG. However, that it eventually 
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proposed, in November 2007, as part of its post-consultation proposals to Member States, 
a draft Regulation to create a new regulatory body, initially to be called the European 
Electronic Communications Market Authority (EECMA), appears to have been driven by 
two additional reasons. First, the Commission at the time was involved in a dispute with 
the German government over proposed legislation to grant Deutsche Telekom a 
regulatory holiday in return for investment in high speed broadband, or so-called next 
generation, infrastructure. Second and as significant, however, was the personal wish of 
the then Information Society and Media Commissioner, Viviane Reding, to see the 
establishment of a new, supranational regulatory body, on the agenda for Member States 
to consider (Sutherland 2008).  
 
In its draft Regulation proposing the new body, the Commission highlighted persistent 
differences in regulatory practice across the EU which was allowing unfair competition in 
telecommunications markets to be maintained. The proposal for EECMA directly 
challenged the soft governance modus operandi of the ERG for its delivery of only ‘loose 
coordination among regulators’ which resulted in ‘lowest common denominator’ 
(European Commission 2007: 9) regulatory solutions. There are two core aspects to the 
proposal of EECMA by the Commission which provide strong suggestions of a desired 
move away from the kind of compromise loose or soft governance which the 
Commission appeared to be suggesting was ineffective in delivering the goals of EU 
telecommunications policy. First, EECMA would be an independent body established 
within the EU institutional framework. It would thus become ‘a Community body subject 
to the same rules of administration and budget that apply to all Community bodies’ 
(European Commission 2007b: 6). EECMA was to have a Board of Regulators 
comprised of the Heads of the EU’s telecommunications NRAs, which, very importantly, 
would take decisions on the basis of simple majority voting. It was also to have a very 
strong supranational dimension. EECMA’s Administrative Board, which would oversee 
the Board of Regulators, was to have half of its members appointed by the Council of 
Ministers and half by the European Commission, thus giving the latter strong influence in 
the future evolution of not only the Board, but, indirectly, EECMA as a whole.  
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Second, whilst EECMA would be an advisory body - except in respect of decisions taken 
on telecommunications markets with a trans-European character – its intended 
relationship with the Commission would give it, de facto, decision making power over 
Member States in key areas. Here, the advice received by the Commission would be used 
by the latter to inform decisions in respect of the powers of veto which the Commission 
already held and, very importantly, proposed an expansion of as part of the revised 
regulatory package, specifically regulatory remedies (see next section).  The epistemic, 
technocratic nature of EECMA’s work in considerable part could have provided the 
Commission with a degree of legitimacy which it might not have been able to claim 
against those interests which would accuse it of being politically motivated. Linked to 
this, the NRA membership of EECMA’s Board of Regulators could serve as a means to 
co-opt to the European (as opposed to the national) view, and create attitudinal 
transformation among, NRAs. This was likely to reduce the possibility of the kind of 
decisions being taken at national level over which the Commission would have to 
exercise a veto. If it did have to do this, nevertheless, it would have the weight of support 
of EECMA behind its decision. A movement in this direction would have amounted to a 
very significant European supranationalisation of regulatory decision-making as well as 
an increase in the Commission’s power as an actor in the European telecommunications 
policy landscape (Simpson 2009). 
 
The reaction to the proposal of EECMA was negative from a whole range of 
governmental, regulatory-institutional and commercial players (Financial Times 29.6.06) 
and eventually resulted in its mutation into a typical EU political compromise weighted 
towards subsidiarity and away from supranationalism. The ERG, which stood to be 
subsumed and replaced by the new body, expressed concerns, particularly in respect of 
being part of any process of veto-extension at the European level over national regulatory 
decisions. Instead, indicating a preference for the continuation  - but also the possible 
development  - of the kind of soft governance functions characteristic of its operation, it 
expressed a preference for  extension of its ‘regulatory “coordination” function’ (Viola 
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2007: annex 2, p3). It was also, however, keen to emphasise that it had, of its own 
volition, become potentially more dynamic, through the introduction of majority voting. 
Big national Member State players and most of their commercial incumbents, notably 
France, Germany, Spain and the UK, were not in favour of the proposal either. Equally 
important, the European Parliament not only expressed opposition, but took significant 
steps to ‘water down’ the supranational dimension of EECMA through a counter 
proposal, in September 2008, for the creation of a Body of European Regulators in 
Telecommunications (BERT), instead of EECMA. Specifically, whilst BERT would be 
an EU body, it would not have a part-supranational Administrative Board and would only 
receive a third of its budget from the EU, the remainder coming from the national level 
through the NRAs. The EP was adamant that it did not want the new body to become a 
supranational European agency. Rather it ‘would be based on the good practice of the 
ERG’ (European Parliament 2008: 78). 
 
The formal EU decision-making process on the matter continued to prove controversial. 
The European Council of Ministers, like the EP, initially expressed strong opposition to 
EECMA (European Council of Ministers 2007). In the light of the EP’s proposed 
modification of the initial Commission proposal, the latter, in November 2008, put 
forward a revised version to the Council for a new Body of European Telecoms 
Regulators (BETR) which still contained the key supranational ingredients of the 
Administrative Board and stipulated BETR’s involvement with the Commission, in the 
proposed regulatory remedies veto process (see below) (European Commission 2008). 
This proposal was rejected by the Council, which eventually reached agreement with the 
EP on the creation of what is now known as the Body of European Regulators in 
Telecommunications (BEREC)2.  The finally agreed Regulation on the establishment of 
BEREC gives a clear indication of how, despite the Commission’s intentions, it is a 
compromise instrument of soft governance with a predominantly intergovernmental 
character. Here, according to the EU, BEREC was created as a result of  the need for 
‘strengthening of the ERG and its recognition in the EU regulatory framework…BEREC 
should neither be a Community agency nor have a legal personality. BEREC should 
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replace the ERG and act as an exclusive forum for cooperation among NRAs, and 
between NRAs and the Commission’ (European Parliament and Council 2009: 2).  
Nevertheless, as a counterweight to this of European character, an interesting feature of 
BEREC is its so-called Office, a professional and administrative arm which is 
‘established as a Community body with legal personality and…legal, administrative and 
financial autonomy’ (ibid). In this respect, BEREC is funded through the EU budget, 
alongside loosely specified voluntary contributions from Member State level, possibly 
through the NRA. However, it is important to note that the Office will be subordinate to 
its intergovernmental Board of Regulators providing professional administrative support 
rather than decision-making input. The Board of Regulators ‘take[s] all decisions relating 
to the performance of its functions’ (European Parliament and Council 2009: article 5, 
para 1) acting by two thirds majority. BEREC has also an intergovernmental 
Management Committee made up of NRAs in equal membership with responsibility for 
the day to day operations of BEREC on which the Commission will also be a Member. 
Interestingly, the Regulation states that ‘each Member shall have one vote’ (ibid: article 
7, para 1) implying that the Commission will have some decision-making influence in the 
Management Committee. The Regulation makes no detailed comment about the 
relationship between the Board of Regulators and the Management Committee. 
 
Like its predecessor, the roles to be undertaken by BEREC are characteristic of soft 
governance. It is charged with the task of developing and disseminating regulatory best 
practice both among NRAs and the Commission and to third parties. It also provides 
opinions on draft decisions made by the Commission in respect of its competences. The 
relatively loose, advisory nature of its remit is confirmed in the assertion that NRAs 
‘shall take the utmost account of any opinion, recommendation, guidelines, advice or 
regulatory best practice adopted by BEREC’ (ibid: article 3, para 3) though, ultimately 
there is no obligation to adopt any of these. This remit, in conjunction with the failure of 
the attempt by the Commission to expand its regulatory veto to regulatory remedies, 
underlines the extent to which informal soft governance is a characteristic feature of key 
compromises in the latest review of the EU’s telecommunications regulatory framework. 
It is to the topic of regulatory remedies that the paper now proceeds. 
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EU POLICY FOR REGULATORY REMEDIES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
The issue of regulatory remedies epitomises the tension between national and European 
levels in the development of EU telecommunications policy and was, consequently, one 
of the main areas of concern highlighted by the European Commission in its initial 
submission to Member States on the review of the ECRF. Noting the emergence of an 
increasing number of cross-national telecommunications service providers and users, the 
Commission also cited complaints received about regulatory inconsistency. At fault were 
NRAs who were producing divergent decisions in the face of similar regulatory problems 
in areas such as accounting separation, scope of access obligations, mobile termination 
rates, interconnection charges and unbundled local loop pricing, the wholesale level 
being particularly important. It was also the case that terms of award and conditions of 
use varied across the EU for radio spectrum and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
services (European Commission 2006c 67-70). The Commission also noted that even 
where the same regulatory remedies were produced by NRAs, their implementation 
differed (European Commission 2006b). The independence and level of resourcing of 
NRAs was also questioned as was the approach to dealing with appeals against regulatory 
decisions of NRAs, some of which took more than 5 years to be resolved by national 
courts. It was further claimed that the stipulation of the 2002 Framework Directive that, 
pending an appeal, the NRA decision should stand was being ignored in certain Member 
States – in fact in some cases ‘suspension of NRA decisions was practically automatic’ 
(European Commission 2006c: 71). Separately, the Commission also claimed that in 
respect of some decisions it took, the NRA did not ‘carry out and re-notify a revised 
market review’ (European Commission 2006b: 17). 
 
In its initial proposals in respect of remedies, the Commission focused on the article 7 
procedure of the ECRF’s Framework Directive, defining it as a route to ensure that a 
more consistent application of regulatory remedies might take shape across the EU. The 
Commission claimed that in the areas in which it had been granted a veto on NRA 
decisions in the Framework Directive – that is, the definition of markets and the 
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assessment of significant market power (SMP)  - greater consistency had resulted. As a 
consequence of this, it proposed an extension of its veto powers to cover regulatory 
remedies (European Commission 2006a 9). Justifying this, the Commission argued that 
‘consistency has been improved in the way that markets are defined and SMP is assessed, 
but only to a lesser extent in relation to the choice of appropriate remedies’ where some 
remedies ‘solved only part of the competition problem identified, appeared to be 
inadequate or might have produced effective results too late’ (European Commission 
2006b: 17-18).  
 
In its impact assessment document presented after the first phase of the consultation, the 
Commission presented three policy options to Member States, each of which would have 
a significant bearing on the future treatment of regulatory remedies in EU 
telecommunications. The options were framed around the possibility of creating the new 
regulatory authority for electronic network communications discussed above. A first 
option, to create a Single European Regulatory Authority would have meant that the body 
would undertake market analyses and impose regulatory remedies directly. Any appeals 
against these decisions would, consistent with the supranational nature of the body, be 
dealt with by the European Court of Justice. A second option was presented to Member 
States which would have involved the creation of an independent European regulatory 
authority, to subsume the ERG and not be part of the EU supranational institutional 
apparatus, which would provide advice in market review procedures to the Commission. 
In tandem with this, the Commission’s regulatory powers would be increased to oversee 
market analysis and regulatory remedies, including a veto right in the latter, as well the 
right to suggest appropriate remedies. The third option presented to Member States was 
the least radical and, according to the Commission, ‘would rely on voluntary co-
ordination without any transfer of power to a central authority’ and would amount to a 
formalisation and enhancement of the ‘coordinating role of the current institutions 
including the ERG’ (European Commission 2007c: 77). Here, in respect of regulatory 
remedies, the Commission envisioned the production of a Recommendation in which it 
would specify the coordination role of the ERG in Framework Directive article 7 
procedures and NRAs remedies policies. The Recommendation would also provide 
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guidelines on best practice, a classic soft governance measure. Beyond this, the 
Commission envisioned better coordination between national courts in respect of 
nationally based appeals in respect of regulatory decisions. Here, the Commission argued 
that ‘the ERG could play a more formal advisory role to the Commission in the Article 7 
procedures…[where]…the Commission would take due account of the ERG’s position’. 
In the Commission’s own words, this option would a create ‘a kind of self-regulatory 
framework among national regulators rather than an increased regulatory oversight of the 
Commission’ (European Commission 2006c: 77-78).  
 
Tellingly, at this juncture, the Commission admitted from the initial phase of its 
consultation that most NRAs were not in favour of it obtaining any regulatory remedies 
veto oversight powers. Nonetheless, in its assessment of the three options presented, it 
declared itself very much in favour of the second, though it was noted that even this was 
unlikely to deliver full regulatory harmonisation. The Commission noted the risk of 
relying on the kind of voluntary cooperation, not least between NRAs, bound up in the 
third option it presented to Member States. Pointedly, it declared that ‘there are 
insufficient guarantees that the voluntary co-ordination would work in practice’. Overall, 
the Commission argued that ‘it would be more difficult to guarantee the consistency of all 
NRA’s decisions over remedies, especially since the Commission comments do not have 
the legal status of a Decision’ (ibid: 83-85). In a separate staff working document on the 
review, the Commission declared its long term intention to overcome the problem of 
elements of the article 7 procedure being spread across the Framework Directive and a 
2003 Commission Recommendation by creating a single EU Regulation, a move that 
would certainly serve to concretise this part of the ECRF. However, this has not, at the 
time of writing, materialised. In this document, the Commission also criticised the 
practice of certain NRAs of splitting the notification process to the Commission into, 
initially, an analysis of market definition and/or SMP assessment and, thereafter, SMP 
assessment and/or proposed remedies (European Commission 2006b: 17). 
 
Despite the Commission’s arguments, reaction to its proposed veto extension to 
regulatory remedies proved extensively negative. The International Director of the UK 
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regulator, Ofcom, Alex Blowers, argued that it ‘was too early to conclude that there is a 
problem concerning harmonisation of regulatory measures’, whilst the Chair of the ERG 
contended that ‘local regulators will always be best placed to understand and appreciate 
the vagaries of local markets’ (Mallinder 2006). It was even claimed the Competition 
Directorate of the Commission itself was initially concerned about the reform proposals 
(Parker, Edgecliffe-Johnson and Laitner 2007). Elsewhere, the German MEP, Angelika 
Niebler, argued that clarification was required ‘especially as far as the Commission’s 
plans to gradually extend its own competencies are concerned’. More forcefully, the UK 
Conservative MEP, Malcolm Harbour, noted that ‘the Commission has got carried away 
with big ideas of building a new power base, instead of leaving local regulators to get on 
with the job’ (EurActiv.com, 14.11.07: 4-5). The German government argued that the 
Commission’s veto powers might even be removed, rather than strengthened (Humphreys 
2008). In response, EU Commissioner Reding contended that in ‘the interests of the 
internal market, and of legal certainty, there must be a power for the Commission to 
require the notifying national regulator to change its approach’ (EurActiv.com, 3.09.08: 
2). Elsewhere, some new entrant companies and, notably, the UK incumbent BT, 
welcomed the Commission’s proposal (Humphreys 2008). 
 
Despite this opposition, the Commission’s presentation of its proposal to Member States 
in November 2007 did contain the proposal for a veto on remedies. The European 
Parliament in September 2008 rejected the Commission’s proposed veto (EurActiv.com, 
17.11.08). Thereafter, in November, the EU Council of Ministers produced an agreement 
which diluted the Commission’s proposed veto power to an opinion giving role 
(EurActiv.com, 28.11.08). A revised version of the Framework Directive was adopted by 
the EU in December 2009 containing a number of significant changes and additions to 
the article 7 provision on remedies, though absent a right of veto for the European 
Commission, and largely in line with its least preferred third option presented to Member 
States from the consultation. In the revised Framework Directive, NRAs are instructed to 
‘work with the Commission and BEREC to identify the types of instruments and 
remedies best suited to address particular types of situations in the marketplace’ 
(European Parliament and Council 2009: article 7, para 2). This replaces the looser, more 
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intergovernmental, instruction in the previous version that NRAs shall ‘seek to agree on 
the types of instruments and remedies best suited to address particular types of situations 
in the market place’ (European Parliament and Council 2002: article 7, para 2). In respect 
of the already granted Commission veto on NRA decisions on market definitions and 
SMP, a key aspect of the revised directive is the declaration that the Commission ‘shall 
take utmost account of the opinion of BEREC before issuing a decision’ (European 
Parliament and Council, 2009: article 5) which introduces an extra layer of advice giving 
into the procedure. The amended directive also included a specific requirement on NRAs 
to amend or withdraw measures vetoed by the Commission within six months of the 
Commission’s decision (ibid: article 6).  
 
These changes aside, the most significant aspect of the amended Framework directive 
concerns the specification of procedures in respect of consistent application of regulatory 
remedies. In cases where the Commission disagrees with a proposed NRA regulatory 
remedy in respect of a service provider, it will have one month to notify the NRA and 
BEREC how it believes this would be counter to the single market or incompatible with 
EC law. This will then trigger a three month period where BEREC, the Commission and 
the NRA ‘cooperate closely’ to try to agree on what is the most appropriate regulatory 
measure in the case in question, a period in which ‘the views of market participants’ are 
taken into account (ibid: article 7a, para 2).  Within six weeks of the commencement of 
the three month period, the directive requires BEREC to issue an opinion on the 
Commission’s objection. If BEREC does not agree with the Commission’s position or 
does not issue an opinion, or where the NRA amends or maintains its draft measure, the 
Commission, within a month after the end of the 3 month period, having taken ‘utmost 
account’ of BEREC’s opinion, may issue a ‘recommendation requiring’ the NRA to 
amend or withdraw its measure and suggesting proposals for amendment. Within a month 
of the Commission recommendation, the NRA must give notice to the Commission of its 
adopted final measure, though this period may be extended if the NRA wishes to 
undertake a public consultation on the matter. In cases where the NRA decides not to 
amend or withdraw its measure on the basis of the Commission’s recommendation, it 
shall provide a justification for this (ibid: article 7a, paragraphs 3-7).  
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Nonetheless, the soft governance measures of the procedure aside, a potentially 
interesting aspect of the revised directive is contained in Article 19 and the specific future  
possibility of the Commission trying to use this to issue Decisions, which are directly 
enforceable, in respect of remedies should longer term regulatory divergence at the 
national level on key issues be identified. The potential gravity of this issue as a 
Commission veto on remedies through the back door, motivated a clutch of 14 EU 
Member States, comprising, among others the UK, Germany, Spain and Italy3
 
 to declare, 
after the revised regulatory package was finalised, that any such decisions in respect of 
article 19 should refer only to market definition and SMP matters. In an interesting and 
potentially significant riposte, Information Society and Media Commissioner Reding 
stated that the Member States’ declaration had no legal basis and that the European 
Commission would apply article 19 to the issue of regulatory remedies on the 
justification of a threat to the internal market (T-REGS, 2009). 
CONCLUSION  
The policy outcomes of the 2006 review of the ECRF provide a clear illustration of how 
the EU continues to use operational policy solutions from the soft or new governance 
policy toolkit couched in a more hierarchical legislative framework to ensure the 
evolution of its telecommunications regulatory framework. This reflects an uneasy 
compromise between the European Commission’s desire to devise European level 
solutions (involving further transfer of power from the national to the EU level) and 
Member States’ desire to see precise policy solutions devised at the national level within 
a shared set of legal-regulatory parameters agreed at the EU level.  
 
Supranational regulatory solutions, such as the creation of a European level regulatory 
authority with powers to devise and see directly implemented regulatory remedies across 
the EU have proven politically unpalatable to Member States. This arrangement is 
arguably not preferable either for the European Commission since it would take away a 
lot of its current power and create uncertainty in terms of any future relationship that it 
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might have with a new body of this kind. It is also currently difficult to justify in practice, 
given the relatively small number of telecommunications services delivered through 
cross-national markets.  
 
To what extent then can the institutional and procedural compromises highlighted in this 
paper create increasingly similar regulatory practices across harmonising - though largely 
separate - EU telecommunications markets? BEREC amounts only to an incremental 
modification of the ERG. It is likely still to be a body operating along 
‘intergovernmental’ lines, albeit with a Europeanised administrative Office. In respect of 
considering regulatory remedies, its remit is advisory to a body, in the shape of the 
European Commission, which continues only to have a recommendation-making say on 
the subject. However, the new remedies procedure does create the scope for closer 
cooperation among its NRA Members and the Commission – the already strong network 
character of EU telecommunications governance enhances this potential. Here, the 
deliberative processes that might lead to recommendation making, best practice 
dissemination and bench-marking may be more important than the relative procedural 
weakness of the new measures on remedies. Members of BEREC are NRAs which have 
the potential to utilise knowledge gained at the EU level in their work nationally. 
 
The risk is, however, that to work the measures require a degree of cooperation which the 
Commission was sceptical about seeing realised – BEREC may simply amount to little 
more than a continuation of the ERG. Nonetheless, in the new system, institutionally and 
procedurally, the European level will have a new presence. That is will be characterised 
by the features of soft or new governance raises a question over its potential to deliver - 
measures from the soft governance regulatory toolkit whilst politically expeditious may 
be practically inefficacious. The political compromise inherent in the creation of BEREC 
and the new procedure on regulatory remedies allowed progress. Whilst the Commission 
did not achieve its policy goals, a further degree of soft Europeanisation was created. In 
practice, NRAs may now be forced to act more quickly and uniformally and the 
potentially closer relationship between them and the Commission may be a spur to this. 
However, the pull of the national level is still likely to be strong and to ensure that 
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telecommunications will remain firmly an inter-national sector across Europe in the short 
to medium term. Beyond this, however, should the Commission’s prediction of growth in 
pan-European services materialise and an increase in cross-national revenue streams for 
telecommunications service providers become more significant, then soft regulatory 
measures might not only be strong enough to deliver full regulatory harmonisation but 
may even be a ‘bridgehead’ to the creation of a more supranationalised regulatory 
institutional apparatus. By that stage, it is possible that most telecommunications markets 
currently of inter-national character will be subject to general European competition law 
and that any ex ante sector specific regulation in the main will be required for pan 
European services and associated markets. 
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1 The Commission also publishes annual reports on the state of implementation of the EU 
telecommunications package which is often openly critical of Member States compliance with agreements 
made at EU level. 
2 In fact, after the European Council’s second reading the new organisation was given yet another putative 
name, the Group of European Regulators in Telecoms (GERT) 
3 The other states are Austria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, and 
Slovakia.  
